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MELIUS EST PETERE FONTES QUAM SECTARI
RIVULOS
This maxim means that it is better to begin at the fountain than
to wander down the rivulets. It was approved by Coke and is cited
by Missouri authors. It is worthy of consideration in all relations
and especially in construction. To illustrate our views of its universal
importance we call attention to the Code of Civil procedure, a statute,
that came in 1848 and of course has been widely construed.
For a starting point the first two paragraphs of the preface of
Pomeroy's Code Remedies are selected. Here more than a page is
given to the statement that the heart and vitals of the Code have been
taken from the Roman law and that beyond this the differences of
legislation are in matters of regulation only. And the author also
states, the generalities, prolixities and absurdities of the common law
procedure have caused a general revolt, and return to the old law.
The claim of the author that England has borrowed anything from the
American antinomies is not justified, for here let us ask what comes
from England that can be likened to Gulling v. Bank, 28 Nev. 257-280;
or L. R. A. 1916 E., 298-326, where Federal, New York, Illinois, and
other cases are reviewed. To see the differences look at Lester v.
Foxcroft, White and Tudors Leading Equity Cases on the one hand
and Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U. S. 68-79, on the other hand. Where in
England has it been written that a "cause" arises from the evidence
and not from the pleading? (See Gulling, above cited, and cases cited
with it in Hughes and Stafford's Law Restated). Said author's claim
that American and English law are alike is a serious mistake, for the
fact is they are widely apart. England does go to the Roman fountains
for direction while in America the "letter of the act" is sought in op-
position to well stated principles of construction. In America the
legislature is the fountain, while in England the law of Rome, referred
to by Professor Pomeroy, is sought. Of course, when we go to the
Roman law we go to the maxims, and these lead. It was these that
Hamilton commended in the Federalist; and so did Professor Pomeroy
in his Municipal Law and his Equity, but did he in his Code Remedies?
Did he cite one? On the contrary, did he not send us to the statute?
Did he not speak for the Roman, and then send us to the statutes?
Was this not inconsistent? And do not his editors in their prefaces
to this volume charge him with incompetency? Do they not sustain
what is observed of him under the title "Pomeroy" in theLaw Re-
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stated? In the same work criticism is made on Chitty and Stepheh,
and we submit that it is questionable whether Pomeroy understooa1
the subject any better than did the followers of Tidd.
To come to a point, let us say that Pomeroy named the Romani
as a fountain and plainly stated that the Code was taken from it by 'a
reaffirmation of its organic princdiples through legislation. This 'is
most important for it fixes with certainty the origin of the Code. It
is a reaffirmation .of Roman principles. And so it -appears that the
fountain of procedure is Roman. And this brings us to the rule that
when a law is borrowed from another .country or system .the construc-
tion of .this law by that country or system is also borrowed. There
being a .court, the Roman law required a record and .that the "cause"
be written upon this record, to satisfy the requirements of 'the state,
Res Adjudicata, and according to the maxim; (De non apparentibus
et non existentibus Radom est ratio), what is not alleged cannot be
considered or decided. This maxim carries with it Frustra pro-
batur quod probatum non relevat, (It is vain to prove what is not
alleged) ; also this one, Verba fortius accippiuntur contra proferentem,
(Every presumption is against a pleader). And so it is we can pick
from Pomeroy's preface the fact that these cardinal rules are frorm
the Roman. Let us add cthat these maxims are interactions; one
calls for the other; and further they have interactions with the rules
of Res Adjudicata, estoppel, and the rule of certainty, (See the title
"certainty" in Hughes Gr. & Rud., Sec. 240 Story's Equity). Through
the above maxims and subjects the nerve center of procedure IN
touched and involved, and 'all of this is Roman. Here is a fouritairl
which we must seek instead of "wandering down," and this is the
command of the maxim Melius est petore. We wonder why Professof
Pomeroy did not have some use for those maxims and at least quote
them at the head of his sections 506-608. See what a difference it
would have made with these sections. Certainly it would have re-
lieved them of the charge that they are jejune.
It should have been plainly stated in 1776 that constitutional pro-
cedure was founded on the maxims and that they must be cited, at
least the few organic, fundamental ones, such as we have above cited.
Look into the Federalist, the letters of Hamilton (1778), and see
what he said for the maxims, and that the division of state power is a
maxim. Mansfield had given Bristow v. Wright, 2 Doug. 665, which
is reprinted in cases like Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns. 439 (Kent) ;
Slacum v. Pomery, 6 Cranch, 221, (Marshall); Story had given his
Secs. 10, 25-28, Equity Pleading; Smith's Leading Cases, Broom's
Maxims and Greenleaf's Evidence all had been published, reaffi'rmi'ng
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the Roman. The above Afaxims, and the Code came in 1848, also
reaffirming the above maxims, laying it down that there must be a
"icause of action" tested by the general demurrer which is never
waived and also emphasizing that fundamental defects cannot be
aided, Verba fortius, and a judgment must be within the facts stated,
where the pleadings end the judgment ends, (Vicksburg v. Henson,
231 U. S. 259; I Varath v. Ins. Co., 216 N. Y. 220, pleadings are juris-
dictional). Look at these matters and see history and a fountain. Of
what use were any of these matters to the author; he never cited one
of them, not one of the organic maxims or great Code cases before
him. He did cite Story in a local way. Instead of the Roman
maxims, he chose for authority chiefly New York, Abbott, Barber,
Duer, Howard, Lansing reports, the statutes and cases that look to
statutes, local and fiat law. Now see what we have come to; look at
Gulling v. Bank, above cited, L. R. A. 1916 E., 298-326; can learned
courts and annotators tell what the law of the states is? Look at
the pages we cite and see what has happened to the Federal, New
York, Illinois, Missouri, California and other cases. See what soon
followed, Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U. S. 68-79, which denied all the
learnirig of Lester v. Foxcroft, in White and Tudor's Leading Equity
Cases, which the professor never cites. And what was more worthy?
In 1878 came Thompson's Trials which flatly denies all of the above
maxims, Mansfield's cases and their cognates. Kirk v. Hamilton
denied the pleadings, and the principles of Lester v. Foxcroft, that
pleadings are to limit issues and to narrow proofs. (Bliss Code Plead-
ing, Secs. 138, 141). Generally American courts have denied the lat-
ter proposition and they have rapidly drifted into the saturnalia of
judicial anarchy. To prove this let us take the Walrath case, above
cited, and then prove its accuracy by Pomeroy and his followers;
see if cases like Gulling and its cognates are not generally supposed
to be in accord with Pomeroy.
American literature and procedure have departed from the
maxims we have cited and from cases reaffirming them and have be-
come a mass of conflicting statutes and cases. If is conceded that the
law is Roman but the few maxims that underlie and bottom the law
of procedure are never set out, translated and explained and the re-
sult is what has come to be called the "legal jungle," wherein vari-
ances and departures are recognized and tolerated, as are also such
discussions as Secs. 506-608, Pomeroy's Procedure. Vainly we turn
for any principle of the Roman Law in Pomeroy's work, other than
.Ictio personalis nioritur cune persona, he cited no maxims as
he did in his Equity and his Municipal Law where he commended
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them. No theory or system of procedure has a greater principle and
one more worthy of respect than the maxims above set out, nor any
cases more worthy of respect than those reaffirming these maxims. We
have mentioned some of these cases, now why did not Professor
Pomeroy cite some of these fundamental matters? Why have he
and his followers omitted these and showed such a preference for
statutes and cases, local and fiat law? It is manifest that they be-
lieved local and fiat law to be the fountain of procedure, and their
view has been followed to the exclusion of the maxims and their
supporting cases which are the fountain. Have not statutes and cases
been followed until the law has been lost in bewilderment and mire?
Is not the call for revolution and a restatement of the law timely?
We are compelled to look either to the one fountain or the other.
There are two fountains of law, the Roman and the Feudal, i. e.
the maxims or the cases. Bacon and his school follow one and Coke
represented the other. The former believed that there was high and
immutable law and the latter believed that the law was local and fiat,
and that "Parliament was omnipotent"; Blackstone believed the latter
proposition. To this day we allow authors to ride astraddle of the
above paradoxes, write a "deadly parallel', and certainly Professor
Pomeroy did. A thread of the Roman, the higher law, is perceivable
in Clark v. Dillon, (1884), 97 N. Y. 370, Andrews v. Lynch, (1858),
27 Mo. 167, 169, 170, which cited Virginia cases of 1796, 1797,
denying .that "Parliament is omnipotent." Illinois has some very
excellent cases for him who reads principles in cases, C. & A. R. R.
v. Clausen, 173 Ill. 100, 105 S. P. as Andrews. Very plainly this law
appears in Oakley v. Aspinwall, (1850), 3 N. Y. 547, 554-556 (Nemo
debet esse itedex) which was instructively set out in State ex rel Hen-
son v. Sheppard, 192 Mo. 497-517, by Judge Lamm. This principle
governed in Lester v. Foxcroft, White and Tutor's Leading Equity
Cases (L. C. 341, 3 Gr. & Rad.), reaffirmed in 49 L, R. A. (N. S.),
112-122, with notes citing Lester but overlooking Kirk vs. Hamilton,
(1880), which denies the Lester case. Look at Andrews and Oakley
cases and get a glimpse of the Prescriptive Constitution, the funda-
mental law of which Professor Pomeroy constantly made mention but
never cited In praesentia majoris cessat potentia mninoris (In the
presence of the major power of the minor ceases). Look at the cases
we cite and see if Blackstone and Professor Pomeroy and their fol-
lowers did not omit something. The above cases were on fundamen-
tals and can we learn one of those from the instruction they gave
us? How could one not conversant with the prescriptive constitu-
tion ever write for the Bacon school? See how Hamilton spoke for
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the maxims in the Federalist; see how Story and Kent viewed them;
how Professor Pomeroy praised them but omitted everyone even the
greatest of administrative law, in his Code. How can we believe
that he understood them? Could he understand them and still be
waiting for cases?
Professor Pomeroy proclaims that he is Roman and assumes that
he knows what the old law was; if so then he knew that the maxims
above cited are Roman and that they are fundamental in every sys-
tem that can serve the state, Res Adjudicata. Systems that serve
Res Adjudicata and its maxims are the same in substance, and aie
not the maxims we cite, principles ofRes Adjudicata which underlie
all law? (U. S. v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85, 88, Sees. 35-37, 3
Gr. Ev.). The maxims above cited are a part of the common law of
Mansfield, of Kent and of Story and can legislatures abolish this law
as is assumed? It has not been done and it cannot be done. If it
has been swept away then what new thing has come? Let this new
thing be pointed out. If these maxims have been abolished then let
it be so stated so we can understand the instructor. We think he is
one that must see the word Code in a case before he will classify it as
Code. Let us see: In Sec. 533 of his Procedure, Pomeroy cites Antis-
del v. R. R. 27 Wis. 145, which he can see arose in a Code state, and is
therefore a Code case; and he approves this case although it reaffirms
Verba fortuis; it involved horses, and is exactly like Dovaston v. Payne.
(Smith's Lead. Cas. L. C. 217, 3 Gr. & Rud.), but the latter is a
cow case. In his Sec. 546, he denounces Verba fortuis and against it
quotes the Code which he thinks sweeps away the views of Judge
Napton in the Andrews case, above cited. The Dovaston and Antisdel
cases are exactly alike and he approves one and denounces the other
in the actions cited. Here is an illustration of the "deadly parallel."
Along with the contradictions we point out we are giving study to
Professor Thompson's Cases on Equity Pleading and Practice (Mich.
Univ. 1903), 118-123, which reprints Dovaston (a law case), to
illustrate Verba fortfis in equity. Other Professors instruct us of
Dovaston and tell us that it is obsolete. In New York it is reaffirmed
in Clark v. Dillon above cited. In England it is adhered to. Hyams
v. Stuart King, (1908) 2 K. B. 696, 717-724, 6 Brit. Rul. Cases
983-989 (a judgment must rest on a pleading); (this cannot be sup-
plied by liberal construction and presumptions), Gilman v. R. R.,
268 Ill. 305. with dissenting opinion.
Whoever will study the necessities of Res Adjudicata will see that
1'erba fortius is a principle and while expressed in Dovaston it is not
dependent on cases or any authority; it is founded in sense and rea-
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son and cannot be swept away as supposed by Professor Pomeroy,
nor lost in doubt as supposed by Professor Thompson. Had they
gone to the fountain Res Adjudicata, they could have been more
positive and instructive. When Res Adjudicata is taught as the
"king pin" of procedure then the fountain will appear and cases like
Richards v. R. R. 124 Ill., 516, and the Woirath case can be seen and
understood from principle, that they are alike. Compare these with
the cases cited in L. R. A. 1916 E. 298-326. Why certainty is essen-
tial will appear from these cases. Afelius est petere fontes quam sec-
tari rivulos.
The claims that old systems are swept away and that England
has adopted the American Code is a mistake. The old law is still
with us and England has not been attracted to "American Law." Eng-
land ceased to cite American cases in 1874, at the time that the Tweed
litigation had such wide attention in the public press. (See Bryce's
American Commonwealth). On the other hand English courts re-
spect and follow the maxims we have cited.
No rounded work on procedure, the Code, can omit the doc-
trine of "Aider" of which the Feudal follower now gives us a multi-
tude of kinds (See 102 U. S. 79). The principle of Aider in the
Roman law is important and so is Consem'sus tollit errorem. The Code
coming from the Roman has to do with this maxim. Now what have
Code authors done for it? Mention of the principle can be made in
a few lines and it includes discussions in the Feudal law that will fill
rows of Digests, Cycs, and notes to reports and of the books that
commercialism has given the profession. As there are innumerable
rivulets from Res Adjudicata, so there are from Consensus. A view
from the fountain gives a grasp that cannot be gained by wandering
in the jungle and gathering details. It is from the Roman, its Res
Adjudicata, and its Consensus as fountains that begin and flow on
down innumerable rivulets, rules of pleading, evidence, practice and
of jurisdiction. The maxims of procedure are its fountains.
Res Adjudicata and its necessities bring with them the state's
attitude in procedure, the record of substance, the mandatory record,
and the record of formal matter, called the statutory record, which
are so important and so little understood. These matters we are now
told have been lost and left behind. This information is shocking
and plainly informs us that we must restate our law. (Elihu Root,
41 Am. Bar Assn. Report, 364, 365). We most readily concede that
Senator Root's charge is fully justified and it is in order to ask
'who is to blame for this most serious neglect of the great conserving
-principle, the fountain.from which so much issues and flows? To this
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leading principle, Story and Greenleaf give attention, but do the Feudal
authors and Pomeroy? Res Adjudicata is an idea flowing from the
maxim Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, a Roman maxim which
has many cognates; we have mentioned some of them. The
Feudal lawyer did not develop this subject and can we say that he
understood it? What has he done for the record upon which it de-
pends? What has been his treatment of these vital matters, these
nerve centers of procedure? Now when one tells us that something
new has come and is from the Roman, do we not look for and expect
something else than a Feudal treatment of the greatest matters of the
Roman law, its greatest maxims of administrative law? Must not
these be mentioned and explained? Must we not look away from the
Feudal, its statutes and cases and look for principles? The Roman
law is built out of principles and the Feudal out of local and fiat
statutes and cases. Professor Pomeroy calls for more statutes and
cases, and Senator Root says that these must be swept away. And
so the student finds himself without rudder, swirling between Scylla
and Charybdis. Addled by advertisements of audacity and mendacity
he may find the orations of a few leading lawyers-whose voices are
like "one crying in the wilderness"-- in their addresses before the bar
associations detailing the condition of the laggard outcast profession
that its "ignorance is appalling," that a cataclysm is near, and
that the "crisis of law and the incompetency of the legal profession,"
is here. (Frederick R. Coudert in the 36 Am. Bar. Assn. Report,
676, 688, A. D. 1911).
The pageant of 2,000 years ago was observed by Caeser and Cicero
who saw the Constitution passing and the Republic drifting into the
Empire; in St. Matthew the Saviour spoke no better for the stability
of government and of the lawyer and his establishments as a fountain
which he likened to "a whited sepulchre." The lawyer and his
contributions to government was understood by the Roman when
in his comprehensive language he said Multitudo imperitorem perdit
curiam. All persons know that legal ligature is a "legal jungle,"
and that the lawyer has looked on for two generations
and seen the discussions become a "deadly parallel," a gathering of
cases and statutes from which able annotators cannot pick out the
law of courts, (L. R. A. 1916 E. 298-326). A Babel has come and the
lawyer has looked on in calm serenity and has seen the fountains of
his professional learning gathered and flowing through the states a
veritable River Styx. This river, an Amazon, flowing through many
tribes, each having for it a local name and each a council which is
supposed to regulate its course and flow; the collections of all these
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tribes, so to speak, is the "legal jungle" referred to. And such is the
goft of commercialism and its empiricists along the stream who have
mesmerized the chiefs of the tribes referred to. Of this dreadful
condition a great lawyer spoke, Joel P. Bishop, who in the preface
to his New Criminal Law comments upon the peculiarities of the
lawyer, his indifference, blindness and gullibility, voracious appetite
for the effusions of something new, fresh from the slums of quackery.
Both Bacon and Bishop foretold what would come to the profession
by teaching local and fiat law. And today do we not see a profession,
storm-swept by false and deceitful advertising, by clamor and hurrah,
hawking off on the student and professor nothing more than a catalogue
of commercialism's output, for a worthy exposition of fundamentals?
What book in fifty years has commercialism given, to teach the logic
and the philosophy of the law better than the Code Remedies referred
to? And what has happened to the Code? This may be gathered from
the addresses we refer to. The logic and the philosophy of the law can
be written in a few pages, and instead of this, see the overtoppling
gatherings of Digests, Cycs, annotations and notes to reports, form
books, and gatherings of chaff-pads and bound by office hands, labelled
as text books. Look at this gathering, the "legal jungle." What suc-
cess can we have teaching it to our Insular Lawyer? Look at our
home product? And what can we do for the foreign lawyer? In a
general way the orations referred to tell us plainly enough; they
tell us in plain language that our books are worthless. (41 Am. Bar
Assn. Report 365, Elihu Root).
And what greater wrong is there than writing antinomies for
the profession? Of perceiving that the logic and philosophy of the
law is Roman and professing to write from this fountain and instead
write from Feudal ideas, its cases and statutes? Too long we have
assumed that the fundamentals are of Feudal origin. Do we learn
principles when all we know are cases and statutes? Are not
maxims constitutional law as claimed by Hamilton? By departing
from them have we not "disentegrated and undermined fundamental
law?" Now it is asked "what of the Constitution is left?" (41 Am.
Bar Assn. Report 376).
WM. T. HUGHES.
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